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Abstract
This paper presents a machine learning approach to large-scale monitoring for malicious activi-
ties on Internet. In the proposed system, network packets sent from a subnet to a darknet (i.e.,
a set of unused IPs) are collected, and they are transformed into 27-dimensional TAP (Traﬃc
Analysis Proﬁle) feature vectors. Then, a hierarchical clustering is performed to obtain clusters
for typical malicious behaviors. In the monitoring phase, the malicious activities in a subnet are
estimated from the closest TAP feature cluster. Then, such TAP feature clusters for all subnets
are visualized on the proposed monitoring system in real time. In the experiment, we use a big
data set of 303,733,994 darknet packs collected from February 1st to February 28th, 2014 (28
days) for monitoring. As a result, we can successfully detect an indication of the pandemic of
a new malware, which attacked to the vulnerability of Synology NAS (port 5,000/TCP).
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1 Introduction
Recently, cyber-attacks are one of the most serious problems in our life. There exist vari-
ous kinds of cyber threads such as malware infection, DDoS attacks, probing to ﬁnd security
vulnerability, drive-by download attacks, phishing, spam mails to lure malicious web site, and
targeted e-mail attack, which intend to steal money/important information and to stop/disturb
public services, etc. To protect users form such cyber threads, it is important to grasp malicious
activities not only within a local network domain but also on the Internet as a whole.
One way to observe large-scale events taking place on the Internet is to use a network
telescope called darknet. The darknet is deﬁned as an unused address-space of a computer
network, which should not have any normal communications from other computers. Therefore,
almost all traﬃc to the darknet is suspicious, and we can grasp the information either on cyber-
attacks or insigniﬁcant communications due to misconﬁgurations. Observable cyber-attacks are
mainly activities of random scanning worms and DDoS backscatter. Therefore, only a part of
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cyber-attacks can be monitored by observing the darknet traﬃc. However, since the darknet can
receive packets from the whole Internet space, it allows us to monitor the large-scale malicious
activities on the Internet.
In this paper, we develop a darknet monitoring system that can grasp large-scale malicious
activities by analyzing darknet traﬃc features. To actualize the real-time monitoring, the source
IP space is divided into subnets, and the network traﬃc in each subnet is transformed into a
feature vector based on the TAP (Traﬃc Analysis Proﬁle) analysis that classiﬁes short-time
network traﬃc into 27 categories based on the numbers of packets, destination IPs/ports, and
source IP/ports. In addition to TAP features, we use malware signatures to classify darknet
packets. In the proposed monitoring system, the TAP type information of all active hosts in a
subnet is accumulated and deﬁned as a feature vector. Then, a hierarchical clustering algorithm
based on the furthest neighbor method is applied to such feature vectors in order to ﬁnd some
useful information on malicious activities.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we ﬁrst give a brief survey on
machine learning approaches to grasping malicious activities using darknet. Section 3 presents
a subnet-based monitoring system to capture the dynamical changes in malicious activities in
real-time. In Section 4, we conduct a monitoring experiment using one-month darknet packet
data that are sent from a subnet including 65,536 hosts to /16 darknet sensors including 65,536
IP addresses. Finally, we address the conclusions of this work and future work in Section 5.
2 Related Work
There have been many approaches to analyzing darknet traﬃc using machine learning methods.
Yamauchi et al. [10] proposed a botnet detection method that can extract the pure botnet
transmission from darknet traﬃc data by nonnegative matrix factorization (NMF) [8, 9]. In
this method, NMF is used to decompose signals related to the botnet transmission from darknet
traﬃc, which are often buried in other frequent malware transmission. Ko et al, [7] proposed
a classiﬁcation method to identify malicious darknet packets that are caused by real cyber-
attacks. In the proposed method, the three main modules dealing with ICMP, Torrent (a
peer-to-peer ﬁle transfer protocol), and TCP protocols ﬁlter out unsuspicious darknet packets
based on their communication characteristics. In the above approaches, speciﬁc information on
cyber-attacks is intended to extract from the darknet traﬃc.
For a monitoring purpose, Ban et al. [1] presented a monitoring system that characterizes
the behavior of long term cyber-attacks by mining the darknet traﬃc data collected by the
nicter project [5]. In this system, machine learning techniques such as clustering, classiﬁcation,
function regression are applied to the analysis of darknet traﬃc. Bou-Harb et al. [2] proposed
a multidimensional monitoring method for source port 0 probing attacks by analyzing darknet
traﬃc. This method is aiming for extracting and ﬁngerprinting malicious darknet traﬃc from
received packets. By performing unsupervised machine learning techniques on the extracted
traﬃc, the activities by similar types of hosts are grouped by employing a set of statistical-based
behavioral analytics. However, this approach is targeted only for source port 0 probing attacks.
3 Subnet-based Darknet Monitoring System
3.1 Traﬃc Analysis Proﬁle (TAP) and Malware Signature
As mentioned in Section 1, packets delivered to the darknet are basically generated as the
results of malicious acts such as network scan and DDoS attack. Therefore, to infer the types
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Figure 1: Traﬃc Analysis Proﬁle (TAP) to classify darknet traﬃc features.
of malicious activities, temporal traﬃc features are analyzed for darknet packets. For known
malwares, their activities are featured by some typical temporal patterns of packet traﬃc to
speciﬁc ports called malware signatures. Therefore, if the packet traﬃc from a host is matched
with a certain malware signature, the infection type is easily identiﬁed. However, there are many
suspicious traﬃc patterns which are not exactly matched with any known malware signatures.
To classify such suspicious malicious activities, Suzuki et al. [4, 6] have proposed Traﬃc
Analysis Proﬁle (TAP) analysis (see Table 1) for the darknet analysis. As seen in Table 1,
there are 19 TAP types to categorize traﬃc features of darknet packets. A TAP type is deter-
mined based on the number of packets, the number of destination/source ports, the number
of destination IP addresses, and scan types (sequential or random) for every 30-second dark-
net traﬃc. For example, if darknet packets are sent from a source host with a single port to
a speciﬁc port on multiple random destination IPs, the TAP type is classiﬁed as ‘Random-
FunSpan(5.2)’ which is possibly a network scan to ﬁnd hosts with security vulnerability (see
Fig. 1). For ‘HammerN(2.N)’, multiple types of attacks can be considered depending on the
number of packets N . Hammer is a type of malicious behaviors which intermittently sends
multiple packets to a speciﬁc port of a speciﬁc host. Our preliminary observation tells that
‘HammerN(2.N)’ with more than N = 10 does not happen frequently. Therefore, we con-
sider the 9 types of ‘HammerN(2.N)’(N = 2 · · · 10) as TAP features. Here, we assume that
‘Hammer10(2.10)’ cover all the attacks with more than N = 10.
From the above discussion, we consider 27 TAP types in total as darknet traﬃc features to
discriminate cyber-attacks.
3.2 Subnet-based Darknet Traﬃc Features
The above-mentioned TAP analysis is applied to individual source hosts to feature the type of
cyber-attacks. However, monitoring all of the individual hosts in the internet is hardly carried
out because a huge number of hosts could give security alerts simultaneously. Therefore, we
propose a large-scale monitoring system that observe the infection states of subnets: a group of
hosts with a certain range of IP space such as ISP, company, institution, and so on. Obviously,
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Figure 2: An example of feature vector transformation: (a) TAP vectors for subnets from t = 1
to F , (b) summation of TAP vectors, and (c) subnet feature vector representing infection status.
such a subnet-based monitoring system cannot detect security incidents of individual hosts.
However, it can be considered as a ﬁrst warning system to grasp the collective trends of malicious
activities within a subnet.
To represent the attack type of a source host, let us deﬁne a 27-dimentional TAP vector
v
(t)
i = {v(t)i1 , · · · , v(t)i27} for the ith host at the tth time ﬂame (30 sec.), where
v
(t)
ij =
{
1 if an attack by the ith host is categorized into the jth TAP type,
0 otherwise.
(1)
Since we construct a subnet-based monitoring system, a feature vector should include the
collective information on TAP types of all active hosts within a subnet. Then, let us deﬁne the
following TAP feature vector V k by accumulating TAP vectors of all hosts in a subnet for F
time ﬂames:
V Fk = ln
(∑
t∈F
∑
i∈Hk
v
(t)
i + 1
)
(2)
where Hk is the set of hosts in the kth subnet. The reason to take the logarithm in Eq. (2)
is that the diﬀerence in a small number of hosts is important compared with that in a large
number. Let us take an example in Fig. 2 to explain how a TAP feature vector V Fk is calculated.
An example case in Fig. 2(a) illustrates a table of TAP types of 65,536 hosts (i.e., a /16
subnet is assumed). As seen in Fig. 2(a), each column corresponds to a TAP vector of a host
at the time ﬂame t (t = 1, cdots, F ). For example, the TAP type of host #2 is ‘Pong(1.1)’ and
that of host #65,535 is ‘Hammer1(2.1)’ at the time ﬂame t = 1, Note that if a host is non-active
(i.e., only a few or no packet is transmitted), no TAP type is provided; therefore, a TAP vector
for a non-active host is a zero vector. Figure 2(b) shows a TAP vector obtained by summing
all TAP vectors in Fig. 2(a). Then, a TAP feature vector in Eq. (2) is obtained as shown in
Fig. 2(c).
As mentioned in 3.1, a known malware can be identiﬁed by their signatures. For a host
infected by known malwares, they should not be considered into a TAP feature vector because
the proposed monitoring system is developed to detect unknown cyber-attacks. Therefore, the
signature matching is ﬁrst performed to every hosts in a subnet, and the TAP type is provided
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only for the hosts whose packet traﬃc pattern is not matched with any malware signatures.
Then, a subnet feature vector is created by accumulating TAP vectors for such unmatched
hosts. If the majority of hosts in a subnet have known malware signatures, such a subnet
should be immediately identiﬁed as an infection state by the malware without transforming
into a TAP feature vector.
3.3 Monitoring Subnet Infection Status Using TAP Features
To monitor malicious activities on subnets, we adopt a vector quantization approach, in which
a subnet state is associated with the closest cluster representing a typical type of malicious
activities. For this purpose, we perform a clustering algorithm for collected darknet packets
X = {xi}Ni=1 (i.e., training data set). In this work, we adopt a hierarchical clustering in which
two clusters with the closest distance are merged until the cluster distance reaches a threshold
θ. Here, we adopt the following farthest neighbor method as a distance measure D(Ci, Cj) for
two clusters Ci, Cj :
D(Ci, Cj) = max
k,l
‖xk − xl‖ where xk ∈ Ci and xl ∈ Cj . (3)
This clustering algorithm is also known as the complete-linkage clustering [3]. This clustering
avoids a drawback of the alternative single linkage method - the so-called chaining phenomenon,
where clusters formed via single linkage clustering may be forced together due to single elements
being close to each other, even though many elements in each cluster may be very distant to
each other. Complete linkage tends to ﬁnd compact clusters of approximately equal diameters.
The outputs of the clustering algorithm are cluster data sets {Ci = {xˆij}Nij=1}Mi=1 where xˆij is
the jth data of the ith cluster Ci and Ni is the number of data in Ci.
The monitoring phase is summarized as follows. As explained in 3.2, the transformation of
darknet packets into a feature vector is conducted for every subnets at every time ﬂames. At
the time ﬂame F , a TAP feature vector for the kth subnet V Fk is calculated by Eq. (2). Then,
the closest cluster Ci∗ is obtained based on the farthest neighbor method where the distance is
given by
d(V Fk , Ci) = max
j
‖V Fk − V̂ ij‖. where V̂ ij ∈ Ci. (4)
Finally, the cluster information Ci∗ is displayed on the monitoring system.
4 Experiments
4.1 Experimental Setup
In the experiment, we use the data set of darknet packs collected from February 1st to February
28th, 2014 (28 days) by the National Institute of Information and Communications Technology
(NICT), Tokyo, Japan. The used darknet sensor covers /16 IP space (i.e., the number of
sensing destination IP addresses is 65,536), and the total number of collected darknet packets
is 303,733,994. For the sake of convenience, the subnet mask is assumed to be /16 in the
experiments; that is, 65,536 subnets are monitored simultaneously on the proposed system.
In the above data set, the number of eﬀective non-zero TAP feature vectors is 503,148 out of
1,835,008 (65,536 subnets × 28 days). To reduce the computational costs, we randomly select
20,000 TAP feature vectors for training, and the hierarchical clustering is performed to obtain
typical malicious activities. In this experiment, the threshold parameter in the clustering is
empirically set as θ = 5 so that we can recognize the transitions of malicious activities easily.
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Figure 3: Monitoring results. (a) Transitions of TAP feature clusters for adjacent 50 subnets.
(b)Transitions of attacks to port 5,000 for adjacent 50 subnets. The color of a dot shows the
intensity of attacks (i.e., the number of darknet packets within a day). The red and green dots
show high and low intensity, respectively.
4.2 Monitoring Results
Before deploying the developed monitoring system in practical environments, we conduct a
preliminary monitoring test by using the above-mentioned data set collected from February 1st
to February 28th, 2014 (28 days). Since only 20,000 TAP features are used to create 15 cluster
prototypes, the other 483,148 TAP feature vectors are used for a testing purpose.
Due to the space limitation, let us show only a part of monitoring results for 65,536 subnets.
Figure 3(a) shows a monitoring result for adjacent 50 subnets, in which a colored dot represents
the closest TAP feature cluster showing a typical type of malicious activities, and each row
corresponds to a temporal transition of closest TAP feature clusters for a subnet. As seen in
Fig. 3(a), the subnets #10 and #14-#17 have a similar transition pattern: clusters #10 →
#8 → #15. This transition pattern is commonly detected among some adjacent subnets. It
may show the process that an unknown malware proliferates and dominates over these adjacent
subnets from the beginning to the middle of February, 2014.
To see what happens in the subnets, we analyzed darknet packets within the subnets #10
and #14-#17. Then, it was found that a lot of darknet packets were sent to the destination
port 5,000. Figure 3(b) illustrates the number of packets to the port 5,000 (i.e., intensity of port
attacks) with colored dots. The red and green dots mean high and low intensity, respectively.
As clearly seen in Fig. 3(b), the attack to the port 5,000 starts from Feb. 12th in the subnets
#10 and #14-#17. Comparing the results in Figs. 3(a) and (b), the TAP feature cluster #8
seems to be related to the start of the attack to the port 5,000. Actually, it is known that this
port attack was aiming for attacking the vulnerability of Synology NAS (port 5,000/TCP), and
the surge of this attack was observed around Feb. 28th, 2014.
Since the cluster #8 starts on Feb. 7th, it is considered to be an indication of the attack
to the port 5,000, and it was observed 20 days before the pandemic of the attack. This is an
encouraging result because an obvious diﬀerence in TAP features were observed on the proposed
monitoring system (see Fig. 3(a)). Therefore, we could be aware of the emergence of the
unknown malware around Feb. 7th, which was quite earlier than the pandemic. Figure 4 shows
the distributions of TAP features in the clusters #10, #8, and #15. From the transitions of
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Figure 4: Transitions of TAP feature distributions: clusters #10 → #8 → #15.
the TAP feature distributions, we can recognize that the intensity of TAP type #21 was clearly
increased along with the increase of the attack to the port 5,000. Then, the TAP type #9 was
intensiﬁed during the sustained weak attack to the port 5,000, which led to the pandemic on
Feb. 28th. Although we haven’t completed the detailed analysis on such a transition of TAP
features, we expect that it could be used as an signature of the malicious activity.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a large-scale monitoring system for cyber attacks using darknet traﬃc
information. In the system, /16 darknet sensors (unused 65,536 destination IPs) are deployed
to collect packets which are sent from a /16 subnet (65,536 source hosts). The darknet packets
collected at every subnet in one day are transformed into a TAP feature vector representing the
activities of unknown malwares. Then, a hierarchical clustering algorithm is applied to TAP
feature vectors to obtain typical types of malicious activities (TAP feature clusters). In the
monitoring phase, darknet packets in a subnet are transformed into a TAP feature vector, and
the closest TAP feature cluster is obtained to estimate the malicious activities in the subnet.
In the experiment, we use a big data set of 303,733,994 darknet packs collected from February
1st to February 28th, 2014 (28 days) by the National Institute of Information and Communi-
cations Technology (NICT). The number of transformed TAP feature vectors is 503,148; due
to our limited computational resources, randomly selected 20,000 TAP feature vectors are used
for clustering and all the feature vectors are used for monitoring. As a result, we found an
interesting transition of TAP feature clusters for some adjacent subnets, which have distinctive
transitions from the other subnets. The detailed packet analysis implies that this distinctive
transition seems to be related to the pandemic of the attack to the vulnerability of Synology
NAS (port 5,000/TCP). Since an indication of this attack was detected on the proposed mon-
itoring system about 20 days earlier than the pandemic, we can conclude that the proposed
system is promising as a large-scale monitoring system for cyber-attacks.
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There still remain open problems in the proposed system. In the system, malicious activities
in a subnet are estimated from the closest TAP feature cluster, which are obtained by performing
a hierarchical clustering for preliminary collected darknet packets. Therefore, if new malwares
emerge, there is no guarantee if the obtained TAP feature clusters can represent the activities
of the new malwares. To solve this, we should adopt an online clustering for a large amount
TAP feature vectors that are generated continuously, and such a system should be implemented
on a distributed storage and distributed processing platform such as Hadoop. In addition, it is
unclear how we can select a suitable threshold for the hierarchical clustering. To detect a new
trend on malicious activities accurately, it is important to have a good visualization property
in the monitoring system. However, if a threshold is too low, redundant clusters are created
and it makes us diﬃcult to ﬁnd a distinctive transition of TAP feature clusters. On the other
hand, if a threshold is too large, only a few clusters are created and we may miss an important
transition due to the coarse representation of states in a TAP feature space. Furthermore, we
need to prove that the proposed system can capture indications of other pandemic of unknown
malwares. The above open problems are left as our future work.
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